Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 145, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 106-123

  Kojima, Fuhito ^a   Manea, Mihai ^b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Exact strategy proofness in large markets; Ordinal efficiency; Probabilistic serial mechanism; Random assignment; Random serial dictatorship

Indexed keywords

EID: 74149093799     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2009.09.002     Document Type: Article

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