Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 112, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 157-172

  Abdulkadiroǧlu, Atila ^a   Sönmez, Tayfun ^b  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

^b KOÇ UNIVERSITY   (Turkey)

Author keywords

House allocation; Matching; Ordinal efficiency; Random assignment

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041760748     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00091-7     Document Type: Article

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