Implementation in generalized matching problems

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Volumn 26, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 429-439

  Sönmez, Tayfun ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

Core; Implementation; Matching problems

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030509404     PISSN: 03044068     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-4068(96)00758-6     Document Type: Article

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