Package auctions and exchanges

Econometrica

Volumn 75, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 935-965

  Milgrom, Paul ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Combinatorial bidding; Core; Package auction; Stable match

Indexed keywords

EID: 34250334744     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: 14680262     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00778.x     Document Type: Article

References (32)

1. Ausubel, L., and P. Milgrom (2002 Ascending Auction with Package Bidding Frontier of Theoretical Economics, 1, 1019.
2. Bernheim, B. D., and M. Whinston (1986 Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation and Economic Influence Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, 1 31.
3. Bikhchandani, S., and J. Mamer (1997 Competitive Equilibrium in an Exchange Economy with Indivisibilities Journal of Economic Theory, 74, 385 413.
4. Bikhchandani, S., and J. M. Ostroy (2002 The Package Assignment Model Journal of Economic Theory, 107, 377 406.
5. Brewer, P., and C. Plott (1996 A Binary Conflict Ascending Price (BICAP) Mechanism for the Decentralized Allocation of the Right to Use Railroad Tracks International Journal of Industrial Organization, 14, 857 886.
6. Cantillon, E., and M. Pesendorfer (2003 Combination Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions Working Paper, Harvard University.
7. Clarke, E. H. (1971 Multipart Pricing of Public Goods Public Choice, 11, 17 33.
8. Compte, O., and P. Jehiel (2000 On the Virtues of the Ascending Auction: New Insights in the Private Value Setting Working Paper, CERAS.
9. Cybernomics (2000 An Experimental Comparison of the Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction and the CRA Combinatorial Auction available at Vries, S., and R. Vohra (2003 Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey INFORMS Journal on Computing, 15, 284 309.
10. Epstein, R., L. Henríquez, J. Catalán, G. Y. Weintraub, and C. Martínez (2002 A Combinational Auction Improves School Meals in Chile Interfaces, 32, 1 14.
11. Green, J., and J.-J. Laffont (1977 Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods Econometrica, 45, 427 438.
12. Groves, T. (1973 Incentives in Teams Econometrica, 61, 617 631.
13. Gul, F., and E. Stacchetti (1999 Walrasian Equilibrium with Gross Substitutes Journal of Economic Theory, 87, 95 124.
14. Hatfield, J., and P. Milgrom (2005 Matching with Contracts American Economic Review, 95, 913 935.
15. Hohner, G., J. Rich, E. Ng, G. Reed, A. Davenport, J. Kalagnanam, H. S. Lee, and C. An (2003 Combinatorial and Quantity Discount Procurement Auctions with Mutual Benefits at Mars, Incorporated Interfaces, 33, 23 35.
16. Holmstrom, B. (1979 Groves Schemes on Restricted Domains Econometrica, 47, 1137 1144.
17. Kelso, A., and V. Crawford (1982 Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes Econometrica, 50, 1483.
18. Klemperer, P. (2000 The Economic Theory of Auctions. Cheltenham, U.K. : Elgar.
19. Milgrom, P. (2000 Putting Auctions Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction Journal of Political Economy, 108, 245 272.
20. Milgrom, P. (2004 Putting Auction Theory to Work. Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press.
21. Milgrom, P. (2006 Incentives in Core-Selecting Auctions Working Paper, Stanford University.
22. Myerson, R. B., and M. A. Satterthwaite (1983 Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading Journal of Economic Theory, 29, 265 281.
23. Ockenfels, A., and A. E. Roth (2003 Last Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon on the Internet American Economic Review, 92, 1093 1103.
24. Ostrovsky, M. (2005 Stability in Supply Chain Networks Working Paper, Stanford University.
25. Parkes, D. (2003 Auction Design with Costly Preference Elicitation available at Kalagnanam, and M. Eso (2002 Achieving Budget-Balance with Vickrey-Based Payment Schemes in Exchanges in Proceedings of the Seventeenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. San Mateo, CA : Morgan Kaufmann, 1161 1168.
26. Parkes, D., and L. Ungar (2002 Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice in Proceedings of the Seventeenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-00). AAAI Press/MIT Press, 74 81.
27. Rezende, L. (2002 Mid-Auction Information Acquisition Working Paper, Stanford University.
28. Roth, A. E., and E. Peranson (1999 The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design American Economic Review, 89, 748 780.
29. Rothkopf, M., T. Teisberg, and E. Kahn (1990 Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare? Journal of Political Economy, 98, 94 109.
30. Sun, N., and Z. Yang (2006 Equilibria and Indivisibilities: Gross Substitutes and Complements Econometrica, 74, 1385 1402.
31. Vickrey, W. (1961 Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders Journal of Finance, 16, 8 37.
32. Yokoo, M., Y. Sakurai, and S. Matsubara (2004 The Effect of False-Name Bids in Combinatorial Auctions: New Fraud in Internet Auctions Games and Economic Behavior, 46, 174 188.