School choice with consent

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 125, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 1297-1348

  Onur, Kesten ^a  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77956598370     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: 15314650     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/qjec.2010.125.3.1297     Document Type: Article

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