Computational aspects of cooperative game theory

Synthesis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning

Volumn 16, Issue , 2011, Pages 1-168

  Chalkiadakis, Georgios ^a   Elkind, Edith ^b   Wooldridge, Michael ^c  

^a TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF CRETE   (Greece)

^b NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY   (Singapore)

^c UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

coalition formation; coalition structure generation; computational complexity; core; representations; Shapley value; solution concepts

Indexed keywords

COALITION FORMATIONS; COALITION STRUCTURE; CORE; REPRESENTATIONS; SHAPLEY VALUE; SOLUTION CONCEPTS;

ALGORITHMS; ECONOMICS; INTELLIGENT AGENTS; SURVEYS;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 80055068833     PISSN: 19394608     EISSN: 19394616     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.2200/S00355ED1V01Y201107AIM016     Document Type: Article

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