Approximating power indices: Theoretical and empirical analysis

Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems

Volumn 20, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 105-122

  Bachrach, Yoram ^a   Markakis, Evangelos ^b,c   Resnick, Ezra ^a   Procaccia, Ariel D ^a   Rosenschein, Jeffrey S ^a   Saberi, Amin ^d  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^b CWI   (Netherlands)

^c ATHENS UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS   (Greece)

^d Stanford University   (United States)

Author keywords

Banzhaf power index; Coalitional games; Power index; Power index approximation; Power indices; Shapley value; Shapley Shubik power index

Indexed keywords

EID: 77953321432     PISSN: 13872532     EISSN: 15737454     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10458-009-9078-9     Document Type: Article

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