Computational complexity in additive hedonic games

European Journal of Operational Research

Volumn 203, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 635-639

  Sung, Shao Chin ^a   Dimitrov, Dinko ^b  

^a AOYAMA GAKUIN UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

Author keywords

Additive preferences; Coalition formation; computational complexity; Hedonic games; NP complete; NP hard

Indexed keywords

COALITION FORMATION; COALITION FORMATIONS; CORE STABILITY; DECISION PROBLEMS; EXISTENCE PROBLEMS; HEDONIC GAMES; NP-COMPLETE; NP-HARD; STABLE COALITION; STRICT CORE;

POLYNOMIALS;

COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY;

EID: 70449526414     PISSN: 03772217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2009.09.004     Document Type: Article

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