Network formation: Bilateral contracting and myopic dynamics

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 4858 LNCS, Issue , 2007, Pages 191-207

  Arcaute, Esteban ^a   Johari, Ramesh ^a   Mannor, Shie ^b  

^a Stanford University

^b MCGILL UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER NETWORKS; COST EFFECTIVENESS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; OPTIMIZATION; TELECOMMUNICATION LINKS;

BILATERAL CONTRACTING; MYOPIC DYNAMICS; NETWORK FORMATION;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 38449089457     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-77105-0_20     Document Type: Conference Paper

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