Coalitional voting manipulation: A game-theoretic perspective

IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 49-54

  Bachrach, Yoram ^a   Elkind, Edith ^b   Faliszewski, Piotr ^c  

^a MICROSOFT RESEARCH   (United Kingdom)

^b NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY   (Singapore)

^c AGH UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Poland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COALITION FORMATIONS; COALITIONAL GAME THEORY; COALITIONAL MANIPULATIONS; COMPUTATIONAL SOCIAL CHOICES; COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY; EXOGENOUS INPUT; GAME-THEORETIC PERSPECTIVES; SOLUTION CONCEPTS;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; VOTING MACHINES;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 80055096709     PISSN: 10450823     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-020     Document Type: Conference Paper

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