Coalition formation as a dynamic process

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 110, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 1-41

  Konishi, Hideo ^a   Ray, Debraj ^b,c  

^a BOSTON COLLEGE   (United States)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c Barcelona)   (Spain)

Author keywords

Coalition formation; Dynamic equilibrium; Farsightedness

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038348016     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00004-8     Document Type: Article

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