Bidding Clubs: Institutionalized Collusion in Auctions

EC 2000 - Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2000, Pages 253-259

  Leyton Brown, Kevin ^a   Shoham, Yoav ^a   Tennenholtz, Moshe ^a  

^a Stanford University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATION THEORY;

COMPLEMENTARY GOODS; COOPERATION PROTOCOLS; FIRST PRICE AUCTION; PROPERTY; SECOND-PRICE AUCTION;

COMMERCE;

EID: 82555175212     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/352871.352899     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (9)

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3. S. Kraus. Negotiation and cooperation in multi-agent environments. Artificial Intelligence, 94, 1997.
4. D. Kreps. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton University Press, 1990.
5. R. P. McAfee and J. McMillan. Bidding rings. The American Economic Theory, 82: 579-599, 1992.
6. D. Monderer and M. Tennenholtz. Optimal Auctions Revisited. Artificial Intelligence, forthcoming, 2000.
7. Jeffrey S. Rosenschein and Gilad Zlotkin. Rules of Encounter. MIT Press, 1994.
8. T. Sandholm and V. Lesser. Leveled commitment contracts. Working paper (to appear in Games and Economic Behavior), 2000.
9. M. Tennenholtz. Electronic commerce: Prom game-theoretic and economic models to working protocols. In IJCAI-99, 1999.