Feasible formation of coalitions among autonomous agents in nonsuperadditive environments

Computational Intelligence

Volumn 15, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 218-251

  Shehory, Onn ^a   Kraus, Sarit ^b  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; COMPUTER SIMULATION; MATHEMATICAL MODELS;

COALITION FORMATION; DISTRIBUTED ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS;

ROBOTICS;

EID: 0032599448     PISSN: 08247935     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0824-7935.00092     Document Type: Article

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