Bargaining and value

Econometrica

Volumn 64, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 357-380

  Hart, Sergiu ^a   Mas Colell, Andreu ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Coalitional games; Consistent value; n person bargaining; Noncooperative implementation; NTU value; Shapley value

Indexed keywords

BARGAINING; COALITION; N PERSON GAME; NON COOPERATIVE GAME;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 0030364622     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2171787     Document Type: Article

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