Power in threshold network flow games

Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems

Volumn 18, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 106-132

  Bachrach, Yoram ^a   Rosenschein, Jeffrey S ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

Coalitional games; Network flow; Network reliability; Power index

Indexed keywords

EID: 58049177903     PISSN: 13872532     EISSN: 15737454     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10458-008-9057-6     Document Type: Article

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