Dynamic coalition formation and the core

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 49, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 363-380

  Arnold, Tone ^a   Schwalbe, Ulrich ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HOHENHEIM   (Germany)

Author keywords

Bounded rationality; Coalition formation; Core; TU games

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036288743     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(02)00015-X     Document Type: Article

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