Methods for task allocation via agent coalition formation

Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 101, Issue 1-2, 1998, Pages 165-200

  Shehory, Onn ^a   Kraus, Sarit ^b,c  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^c UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

Author keywords

Coalition formation; Multi agent cooperation; Task allocation

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; APPROXIMATION THEORY; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; DISTRIBUTED COMPUTER SYSTEMS;

COALITION FORMATION; MULTI AGENT COOPERATION; TASK ALLOCATION;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

EID: 0032074719     PISSN: 00043702     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0004-3702(98)00045-9     Document Type: Article

References (64)

1. R.J. Aumann, The core of a cooperative game without side-payments, Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 98 (1961) 539-552.
2. R.J. Aumann and B. Peleg, Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side-payments, Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 66 (1960) 173-179.
3. E. Balas and M. Padberg, On the set covering problem, Oper. Res. 20 (1972) 1152-1161.
4. E. Balas and M. Padberg, On the set covering problem: An algorithm for set partitioning, Oper. Res. 23 (1975) 74-90.
5. R. Bhatia, S. Khuller and J. Naor, The loading time scheduling problem, in: Proceedings 36th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS-95), 1995, pp. 72-81.
6. A.H. Bond and L. Gasser, An analysis of problems and research in DAI, in: A.H. Bond and L. Gasser (Eds.), Readings in Distributed Artificial Intelligence, Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA, 1988, pp. 3-35.
7. G.H. Chen and J.S. Yur, A branch-and-bound-with-underestimates algorithm for the task assignment problem with precedence constraint, in: Proceedings 10th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, 1990, pp. 494-501.
8. N. Christofides and S. Korman, A computational survey of methods for the set covering problem, Math. Oper. Res. 21 (5) (1975) 591-599.
9. V. Chvatal, A greedy heuristic for the set-covering problem, Math. Oper. Res. 4 (3) (1979) 233-235.
10. E.G. Coffman and L.R. Graham, Optimal scheduling for two-processor systems, Acta Informatica 1 (1972) 200-213.
11. R. Conte, M. Miceli and C. Castelfranchi, Limits and levels of cooperation: disentangling various types of prosocial interaction, in: Y. Demazeau and J.P. Muller (Eds.), Decentralized A.I., Vol. 2, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1991, pp. 147-157.
12. T.H. Cormen, C.E. Leiserson and R.L. Rivest, Introduction to Algorithms, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990.
13. R. Davis and R.G. Smith, Negotiation as a metaphor for distributed problem solving, Artificial Intelligence 20 (1) (1983) 63-109.
14. K. Decker, K. Sycara and M. Williamson, Middle-agents for the internet, in: Proceedings IJCAI-97, Nagoya, Japan, 1997, pp. 578-583.
15. E.H. Durfee and V.R. Lesser, Negotiating task decomposition and allocation using partial global planning, in: L. Gasser and M.N. Huhns (Eds.), Distributed Artificial Intelligence, Vol. II, Pitman/Morgan Kaufmann, London, UK, 1989, pp. 229-244.
16. E.H. Durfee, V.R. Lesser and D.D. Corkill, Coherent cooperation among communicating problem solvers, in: A.H. Bond and L. Gasser (Eds.), Readings in Distributed Artificial Intelligence, Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA, 1988, pp. 268-284.
17. E.H. Durfee and V.R. Lesser, Global plans to coordinate distributed problem solvers, in: Proceedings IJCAI-87, Milan, Italy, 1987, pp. 875-883.
18. D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, Game Theory, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991.
19. M.R. Garey and D.S. Johnson, Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-completeness, W.H. Freeman, San Francisco, CA, 1979.
20. R.S. Garfinkel and G.L. Nemhouser, The set-partitioning problem: set covering with equality constraints, Oper. Res. 17 (1969) 848-856.
21. J.C. Harsanyi, A simplified bargaining model for n-person cooperative game, Internat. Economic Review 4 (1963) 194-220.
22. J.C. Harsanyi, Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations, Cambridge University Press, 1977.
23. B.A. Huberman, R.M. Lukose and T. Hogg, An economic approach to hard computational problems, Science 275 (1997) 51-54.
24. O.H. Ibarra and C.E. Kim, On two-processor scheduling of one-or two-unit time tasks with precedence constraints, J. Cybernetics 5 (3) (1976) 87-109.
25. N.R. Jennings, Controlling cooperative problem solving in industrial multi-agent systems using joint intentions, Artificial Intelligence 75 (2) (1995) 1-46.
26. S. Jha, O. Shehory and K. Sycara, Viewing contingent contracts between agents as options, Unpublished manuscript.
27. J.P. Kahan and A. Rapoport, Theories of Coalition Formation, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ, 1984.
28. S.P. Ketchpel, Forming coalitions in the face of uncertain rewards, in: Proceedings AAAI-94, Seattle, WA, 1994, pp. 414-419.
29. S. Kraus, An overview of incentive contracting, Artificial Intelligence 83 (2) (1996) 297-346.
30. S. Kraus, J. Wilkenfeld and G. Zlotkin, Multiagent negotiation under time constraints, Artificial Intelligence 75 (2) (1995) 297-345.
31. T. Kreifelts and F. Von Martial, A negotiation framework for autonomous agents, in: Proceedings Second European Workshop on Modeling Autonomous Agents in a Multi-Agent World, 1990, pp. 169-182.
32. D. Kuokka and L. Harada, On using KQML for matchmaking, in: Proceedings First International Conference on Multi-Agent Systems, AAAI Press, San Francisco, CA, 1995, pp. 239-245.
33. R.D. Luce and H. Raiffa, Games and Decisions, John Wiley, New York, 1957.
34. T. Mullen and M. Wellman, A simple computational market for network information services, in: Proceedings First International Conference on Multiagent Systems, AAAI Press, San Francisco, CA, 1995, pp. 283-289.
35. B. Nadel, Constraint satisfaction algorithms, Comput. Intell. 5 (1989) 188-224.
36. M. Nodine and A. Unruh, Facilitating open communication in agent systems: the infosleuth infrastructure, in: M. Singh, A. Rao and M. Wooldridge (Eds.), Intelligent Agents 4, Lecture Notes in Artif. Intell., Vol. 1365, Springer, Berlin, 1997, pp. 281-296.
37. P. Prosser, Hybrid algorithms for the constraint satisfaction problem, Comput. Intell. 9 (1993) 268-299.
38. A.S. Rao, M.P. Georgeff and E.A. Sonenberg, Social plans: a preliminary report, in: Decentralized Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 3, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1992, pp. 57-76.
39. A. Rapoport, N-Person Game Theory, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI, 1970.
40. E. Rasmusen, Games and Information, Basil Blackwell, Cambridge, MA, 1989.
41. T.W. Sandholm, An implementation of the contract net protocol based on marginal cost calculations, in: Proceedings AAAI-93, Washington, DC, 1993, pp. 256-262.
42. T.W. Sandholm and V.R. Lesser, Coalitions among computationally bounded agents, Artificial Intelligence 94 (1997) 99-137.
43. L.S. Shapley, A value for n-person game, in: H.W. Kuhn and A.W. Tucker (Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games, Princeton University Press, 1953.
44. O. Shehory and S. Kraus, Coalition formation among autonomous agents: strategies and complexity, in: C. Castelfranchi and J.P. Muller (Eds.), From Reaction to Cognition, Lecture Notes in Artif. Intell., Vol. 957, Springer, Berlin, 1993, pp. 57-72.
45. O. Shehory and S. Kraus, Task allocation via coalition formation among autonomous agents, in: Proceedings IJCAI-95, Montréal, Que., 1995, pp. 655-661.
46. O. Shehory and S. Kraus, Formation of overlapping coalitions for precedence-ordered task-execution among autonomous agents, in: Proceedings ICMAS-96, Kyoto, Japan, 1996, pp. 330-337.
47. O. Shehory, K. Sycara and S. Jha, Multi-agent coordination through coalition formation, in: M. Singh, A. Rao and M. Wooldridge (Eds.), Intelligent Agents 4, Lecture Notes in Artif. Intell., Vol. 1365, Springer, Berlin, 1997, pp. 143-154.
48. R.G. Smith, A framework for distributed problem solving, in: Proceedings IJCAI-79, Tokyo, 1979, pp. 836-841.
49. R.G. Smith, The contract net protocol: high-level communication and control in a distributed problem solver, IEEE Trans. Comput. 29 (12) (1980) 1104-1113.
50. K. Sycara, Persuasive argumentation in negotiation, Theory and Decision 28 (1990) 203-242.
51. K. Sycara, K. Decker, A. Pannu and M. Williamson, Designing behaviors for information agents, in: Proceeding Agents-97, Los Angeles, CA, 1997, pp. 404-412.
52. K. Sycara, K. Decker, A. Pannu, M. Williamson and D. Zeng, Distributed intelligent agents, IEEE Expert - Intelligent Systems and Their Applications 11 (6) (1996) 36-45.
53. K. Sycara and D. Zeng, Coordination of multiple intelligent software agents, Internat. J. Intelligent and Cooperative Information Systems 5 (2-3) (1996) 181-211.
54. S.N. Talukdar, L. Baerentzen, A. Gove and P.S. deSouza, Asynchronous teams: cooperation schemes for autonomous, computer-based agents, Technical Report EDRC-18-59-96, Carnegie Mellon University, Engineering Design Research Center, Pittsburgh, PA, 1996.
55. G. Tidhar, A.S. Rao and E.A. Sonenberg, Guided team selection, in: Proceedings ICMAS-96, Kyoto, Japan, 1996, pp. 369-376.
56. W.E. Walsh and M.P. Wellman, A market protocol for distributed task allocation, in: Proceedings ICMAS-98, Paris, France, 1998.
57. L. Wang and W. Tsai, Optimal assignment of task modules with precedence for distributed processing by graph matching and state-space search, BIT 28 (1988) 54-68.
58. M.P. Wellman, A market-oriented programming environment and its application to distributed multicommodity flow problems, J. Artif. Intell. Res. 1 (1993) 1-23.
59. E. Werner, Toward a theory of communication and cooperation for multiagent planning, in: Proceedings Second Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge, Pacific Grove, CA, 1988, pp. 129-143.
60. M. Williamson, K. Decker and K. Sycara, Unified information and control flow in hierarchical task networks, in: Proceedings AAAI-96 Workshop on Theories of Planning, Action, and Control, Portland, OR, 1996.
61. L. Zhou, A new bargaining set of an n-person game and endogenous coalition formation, Games and Economic Behavior 6 (1994) 512-526.
62. G. Zlotkin and J. Rosenschein, Negotiation and task sharing among autonomous agents in cooperative domain, in: Proceedings IJCAI-89, Detroit, MI, 1989, pp. 912-917.
63. G. Zlotkin and J. Rosenschein, Cooperation and conflict resolution via negotiation among autonomous agents in noncooperative domains, IEEE Trans. Systems, Man Cybernetics, Special Issue on Distributed Artificial Intelligence 21 (6) (1991) 1317-1324.
64. G. Zlotkin and J. Rosenschein, Coalition, cryptography, and stability: mechanisms for coalition formation in task oriented domains, in: Proceedings AAAI-94, Seattle, WA, 1994, pp. 432-437.