Using mechanism design to prevent false-name manipulations

AI Magazine

Volumn 31, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 65-77

  Conitzer, Vincent ^a   Yokoo, Makoto ^b  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b KYUSHU UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY;

ALLOCATION RULE; AUCTION MECHANISMS; DESIGN MECHANISMS; MECHANISM DESIGN; REAL AGENT; REAL-WORLD; SET MECHANISM; VOTING RULES;

MACHINE DESIGN;

EID: 79959762999     PISSN: 07384602     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1609/aimag.v31i4.2315     Document Type: Review

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