Computational aspects of extending the shapley value to coalitional games with externalities

Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications

Volumn 215, Issue , 2010, Pages 197-202

  Michalak, Tomasz ^a   Rahwan, Talal ^a   Marciniak, Dorota ^b,c   Szamotulski, Marcin ^b,d   Jennings, Nicholas R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

^b NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS   (Poland)

^c UNIVERSITAT POLITÈCNICA DE CATALUNYA   (Spain)

^d INSTITUTO SUPERIOR TÉCNICO   (Portugal)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; COMPUTER GAMES;

COALITION FORMATIONS; COALITIONAL GAME; COMPUTATIONAL ASPECTS; EFFICIENT COMPUTATION; GAME MODELS; GAME-THEORETIC; LOGICAL EXPRESSIONS; PARTITION FUNCTIONS; SHAPLEY VALUE;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 77956017662     PISSN: 09226389     EISSN: 18798314     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.3233/978-1-60750-606-5-197     Document Type: Conference Paper

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