Optimal partitions in additively separable hedonic games

IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 43-48

  Aziz, Haris ^a   Brandt, Felix ^a   Seedig, Hans Georg ^a  

^a TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATIONAL ANALYSIS; HEDONIC GAMES; NASH STABLE PARTITIONS; NP COMPLETE; OPTIMAL PARTITIONS; PARETO-OPTIMAL; POLYNOMIAL-TIME; SOCIAL WELFARE;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; GAME THEORY; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION;

PARETO PRINCIPLE;

EID: 80055097082     PISSN: 10450823     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-019     Document Type: Conference Paper

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