A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 16, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 97-108

  Okada, Akira ^a  

^a KYOTO UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030239578     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1996.0076     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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2. BINMORE, K. G. (1985). "Bargaining and Coalitions," in Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining (A. E. Roth, Ed.), pp. 269-304. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
3. CHATTERJEE, K., DUTTA, B., RAY, D., and SENGUPTA, K. (1993). "A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining," Rev. Econ. Stud. 60, 463-477.
4. GUL, F. (1989). "Bargaining Foundations of the Shapley Value," Econometrica 57, 81-95.
5. HARSANYI, J. C., and SELTEN, R. (1988). A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
6. HART, S., and MAS-COLELL, A. (1996). "Bargaining and Value," Econometrica 64, 357-380.
7. MOLDOVANU, B., and WINTER, E. (1995). "Order Independent Equilibria," Games Econ. Behav. 9, 21-34.
8. OKADA, A. (1992). "Noncooperative Bargaining and the Core of an n-Person Characteristic Function Game," Control Cybern. 21, 231-250.
9. PERRY, M., and RENY, P. J. (1994). "A Non-cooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core," Econometrica 62, 795-817.
10. RUBINSTEIN, A. (1982). "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica 50, 97-109.
11. SELTEN, R. (1981). "A Noncooperative Model of Characteristic Function Bargaining," in Essays in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics in Honor of Oscar Morgenstern (V. Boehm and H. Nachthanp, Eds.), pp. 139-151. Mannheim/Wien/Zurich: Bibliographisches Institut.
12. STÅHL, I. (1972). Bargaining Theory. Stockholm: Economics Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics.