Coalitional Bargaining with Competition to Make Offers

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 19, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 211-220

  Evans, Robert ^a  

^a ST JOHN S COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000785971     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0553     Document Type: Article

References (8)

1. Chatterjee K., Dutta B., Ray D., Sengupta K. A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining. Rev. Econ. Stud. 60:1993;463-477.
2. Gul F. Bargaining Foundations of the Shapley Value. Econometrica. 57:1989;81-95.
3. M. Herrero, 1985, A Strategic Bargaining Approach to Market Institutions, University of London.
4. Lagunoff R. D. A Simple Noncooperative Core Story. Games Econ. Behav. 7:1994;54-61.
5. Moldovanu B., Winter E. Order Independent Equilibria. Games Econ. Behav. 9:1995;21-34.
6. Perry M., Reny P. A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core. Econometrica. 62:1994;795-817.
7. Rubinstein A. Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model. Econometrica. 50:1982;97-108.
8. Selten R. A Noncooperative Model of Characteristic Function Bargaining. Essays in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics in Honour of Oskar Morgenstern. 1981;Bibliographisches Institut, Mannehim.