The advantages of compromising in coalition formation with incomplete information

Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2004

Volumn 2, Issue , 2004, Pages 588-595

  Kraus, Sarit ^a,b   Shehory, Onn ^c   Taase, Gilad ^a  

^a BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

^c IBM HAIFA RESEARCH LAB   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COALITION FORMATION MECHANISM; COMPUTATIONAL RESOURCES; FORMATION MECHANISM; REVENUE DISTRIBUTION;

COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; COMPUTER SIMULATION; FUZZY SETS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; NETWORK PROTOCOLS; PARAMETER ESTIMATION; STOCHASTIC CONTROL SYSTEMS;

INFORMATION ANALYSIS;

EID: 4544279717     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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