Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees

Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 111, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 209-238

  Sandholm, Tuomas ^a   Larson, Kate ^a   Andersson, Martin ^a   Shehory, Onn ^b   Tohmé, Fernando ^b  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST LOUIS   (United States)

^b CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS; DATA REDUCTION; DATA STRUCTURES; GAME THEORY;

COALITION FORMATION; RESOURCE-ROUNDED REASONING;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

EID: 0033165014     PISSN: 00043702     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0004-3702(99)00036-3     Document Type: Article

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