Manipulating the quota in weighted voting games

Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 1, Issue , 2008, Pages 215-220

  Zuckerman, Michael ^a   Faliszewski, Piotr ^b   Bachrach, Yoram ^a   Elkind, Edith ^c  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^b University of Rochester   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; BIONICS; CONTROL THEORY; ELECTRIC SHIP EQUIPMENT;

BANZHAF INDICES; COALITION FORMATIONS; COMPLEXITY CLASSES; EFFICIENT ALGORITHMS; MARGINAL CONTRIBUTIONS; MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS; TOTAL WEIGHTS; UPPER AND LOWER BOUNDS; WEIGHTED VOTING GAMES;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 57749200128     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (20)

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