On representing coalitional games with externalities

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 11-20

  Michalak, Tomasz P ^a   Rahwan, Talal ^b   Sroka, Jacek ^c   Dowell, Andrew ^a   Wooldridge, Michael J ^a   McBurney, Peter J ^a   Jennings, Nicholas R ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF WARSAW   (Poland)

Author keywords

Coalition structure generation; Partition function games; Representation

Indexed keywords

CO-EXISTING; COALITION STRUCTURE; COALITIONAL GAME; ENTIRE SYSTEM; NEW CONCEPT; PARTITION FUNCTIONS; UNIFIED METHOD;

ELECTRIC CONDUCTIVITY MEASUREMENT; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 77950550671     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1566374.1566377     Document Type: Conference Paper

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