A recursive core for partition function form games

Theory and Decision

Volumn 63, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 41-51

  Kóczy, László Á ^a  

^a MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Core; Externalities; Optimism; Partition function; Pessimism

Indexed keywords

DECISION THEORY; PROBLEM SOLVING; RECURSIVE FUNCTIONS;

COALITIONAL GAMES; EXTERNALITIES; PARTITION FUNCTION; PESSIMISM;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 34250858515     PISSN: 00405833     EISSN: 15737187     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-007-9030-x     Document Type: Article

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