Coalitional games in open anonymous environments

Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 2, Issue , 2005, Pages 509-514

  Yokoot, Makoto ^a   Conitzer, Vincent ^b   Sandholm, Tuomas ^b   Ohta, Naoki ^a   Iwasaki, Atsushi ^a  

^a KYUSHU UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

^b Carnegie Mellon University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AUTOMATION; COMPUTATION THEORY; INTERNET;

ANONYMITY-PROOF CORE; COALITIONAL GAMES; SELF-INTERESTED AGENTS;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

EID: 29344448939     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (12)

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