Intuition Fail: Philosophical Activity and the Limits of Expertise

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Volumn 92, Issue 2, 2016, Pages 378-410

  Buckwalter, Wesley ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84961213341     PISSN: 00318205     EISSN: 19331592     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12147     Document Type: Article

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