Gettier made ESEE

Philosophical Psychology

Volumn 27, Issue 3, 2014, Pages 368-383

  Buckwalter, Wesley ^a  

^a CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

Author keywords

Attribution; Experimental Philosophy; Gettier; Intuitions; Knowledge; Moral Judgment; Non Epistemic Factors; Ordinary Language; Theory of Mind

Indexed keywords

EID: 84898901572     PISSN: 09515089     EISSN: 1465394X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2012.730965     Document Type: Article

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