The epistemic side-effect effect

Mind and Language

Volumn 25, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 474-498

  Beebe, James R ^a   Buckwalter, Wesley ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO   (United States)

^b CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77955936378     PISSN: 02681064     EISSN: 14680017     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01398.x     Document Type: Article

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