The folk conception of knowledge

Cognition

Volumn 124, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 272-283

  Starmans, Christina ^a   Friedman, Ori ^b  

^a Department of Psychology ^*  (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO   (Canada)

Author keywords

Epistemic intuitions; Folk psychology; Gettier cases; Knowledge; Theory of mind

Indexed keywords

ADULT; AGED; ARTICLE; BEHAVIOR; BELIEF; COMPREHENSION; CONTROLLED STUDY; ETHNIC GROUP; FEMALE; HUMAN; HUMAN EXPERIMENT; INTUITION; JUSTIFICATION; KNOWLEDGE; MALE; NORMAL HUMAN; PHILOSOPHY; PRIORITY JOURNAL; THEORY OF MIND; THINKING; TRUTH;

ADOLESCENT; ADULT; AGED; AGED, 80 AND OVER; ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE; CAUSALITY; CULTURE; FEMALE; HUMANS; INTUITION; KNOWLEDGE; MALE; MIDDLE AGED; THINKING; YOUNG ADULT;

EID: 84864074518     PISSN: 00100277     EISSN: 18737838     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2012.05.017     Document Type: Article

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