God knows (but does God believe?)

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 166, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 83-107

  Murray, Dylan ^a   Sytsma, Justin ^b   Livengood, Jonathan ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b EAST TENNESSEE STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

Belief; Capacity tendency account; Conviction account; Entailment thesis; Knowledge; Mental assent

Indexed keywords

EID: 84884525191     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-012-0022-5     Document Type: Article

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