Experimenter Philosophy: The Problem of Experimenter Bias in Experimental Philosophy

Review of Philosophy and Psychology

Volumn 3, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 457-467

  Strickland, Brent ^a   Suben, Aysu ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84873202181     PISSN: 18785158     EISSN: 18785166     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s13164-012-0100-9     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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