Putting the trolley in order: Experimental philosophy and the loop case

Philosophical Psychology

Volumn 25, Issue 5, 2012, Pages 661-671

  Liao, S Matthew ^a   Wiegmann, Alex ^b   Alexander, Joshua ^c   Vong, Gerard ^d  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GÖTTINGEN   (Germany)

^c SIENA COLLEGE   (United States)

^d FORDHAM UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Doctrine of Double Effect; Experimental Philosophy; Frances Kamm; Intuitions; Judith Jarvis Thompson; Trolley Cases

Indexed keywords

EID: 84864718468     PISSN: 09515089     EISSN: 1465394X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2011.627536     Document Type: Article

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