Expertise in Moral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral Judgment in Professional Philosophers and Non-Philosophers

Mind and Language

Volumn 27, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 135-153

  Schwitzgebel, Eric ^a   Cushman, Fiery ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84858983468     PISSN: 02681064     EISSN: 14680017     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2012.01438.x     Document Type: Article

References (55)

1. Baron, J. and Ritov, I. 2004: Omission Bias, individual differences, and normality. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 94, 74-85.
2. Bartels, D. 2008: Principled moral sentiment and the flexibility of moral judgment and decision making. Cognition, 108, 381-417.
3. Bealer, G. 1998: Intuition and the autonomy of philosophy. In M. R. DePaul and W. Ramsey (eds), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
4. Bennett, J. 1998: The Act Itself. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
5. Carlsmith, K., Darley, J. and Robinson, P. 2002: Why do we punish? Deterrence and just deserts as motives for punishment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 284-99.
6. Crosthwaite, J. 1995: Moral expertise: a problem in the professional ethics of professional ethicists. Bioethics, 9, 361-79.
7. Cushman, F. A. 2008: Crime and punishment: distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment. Cognition, 108, 353-380.
8. Cushman, F. A., Dreber, A., Wang, Y. and Costa, J. 2009: Accidental outcomes guide punishment in a 'trembling hand' game. PLOS One, 4, e6699.DOI: 6610.1371/journal. pone.0006699.
9. Cushman, F. A., Young, L. and Greene, J. D. 2010: Multi-system moral psychology. In J. Doris, G. Harman, S. Nichols, J. Prinz, W. Sinnott-Armstrong and S. Stich (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
10. Cushman, F. A., Young, L. and Hauser, M. D. 2006: The role of conscious reasoning and intuitions in moral judgment: testing three principles of harm. Psychological Science, 17, 1082-89.
11. Ditto, P. and Liu, B. in press: Deontological dissonance and the consequentialist crutch. In M. Mikulincer and P. R. Shaver (eds), Social Psychology of Morality: The Origins of Good And Evil. Washington, DC: APA Press.
12. Fischer, J. M. and Ravizza, M. 1992: Ethics: Problems and Principles. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
13. Føllesdal, A. 2004: The philosopher as coach. In E. Kurz-Milcke and G. Gigerenzer (eds), Experts in Science and Society. New York: Kluwer.
14. Foot, P. 1967: The problem of abortion and the doctrine of double effect. Oxford Review, 5, 5-15.
15. Frederick, S. 2005: Cognitive reflection and decision making. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19 (4), 25-42.
16. Gino, F., Shu, L. and Bazerman, M. 2010: Nameless + harmless = blameless: When seemingly irrelevant factors influence judgment of (un)ethical behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 111, 93-101.
17. Greene, J. D., Cushman, F. A., Stewart L. E., Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. E. and Cohen, J. D. 2009: Pushing moral buttons: the interaction between personal force and intention in moral judgment. Cognition, 111, 364-71.
18. Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M. and Cohen, J. D. 2001: An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment. Science, 293, 2105-08.
19. Grundmann, T. 2010: Some hope for intuitions: a reply to Weinberg. Philosophical Psychology, 23, 481-509.
20. Haidt, J. 2001: The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108, 814-34.
21. Haidt, J. and Hersh, M. A. 2001: Sexual morality: the cultures and emotions of conservatives and liberals. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 31, 191-221.
22. Hauser, M. D., Cushman, F. A., Young, L., Jin, R. and Mikhail, J. M. 2007: A dissociation between moral judgment and justification. Mind & Language, 22, 1-21.
23. Hofmann, F. 2010: Intuitions, concepts, and imagination. Philosophical Psychology, 23, 529-46.
24. Horvath, J. 2010: How (not) to react to experimental philosophy. Philosophical Psychology, 23, 447-80.
25. Howard-Snyder, F. 2002/2007: Doing vs. allowing harm. In E. N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2010 edition).
26. Kohlberg, L. 1984: The Psychology of Moral Development. Cambridge, MA: Harper and Row.
27. Kuhn, D. 1991: The Skills of Argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
28. Leaman, G. 1993: Heidegger im Kontext. Hamburg: Argument-Verlag.
29. Livengood, J., Sytsma, J., Feltz, A., Scheines, R. and Machery, E. 2010: Philosophical temperament. Philosophical Psychology, 23, 313-30.
30. Lombrozo, T. 2009: The role of moral commitments in moral judgment. Cognitive Science, 33, 273-86.
31. McIntyre, A. 2004/2009: Doctrine of double effect. In E. N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2010 edition).
32. Mikhail, J. M. 2000: Rawls' linguistic analogy: A study of the 'generative grammar' model of moral theory described by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice. PhD dissertation in Philosophy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University.
33. Mikhail, J. 2009: Moral grammar and intuitive jurisprudence: a formal model of unconscious moral and legal knowledge. Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 50, 27-100.
34. Nagel, T. 1979: Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
35. Nelkin, D. K. 2004/2008: Moral luck. In E. N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2010 edition).
36. Paxton, J. M. and Greene, J. D. 2010: Moral reasoning: hints and allegations. Topics in Cognitive Science, 2, 511-27.
37. Petrinovich, L. and O'Neill, P. 1996: Influence of wording and framing effects on moral intuitions. Ethology and Sociobiology, 17, 145-71.
38. Pizarro, D. A. and Bloom, P. 2003: The intelligence of the moral intuitions: comment on Haidt (2001): Psychological Review, 110, 193-96.
39. Quinn, W. S. 1989: Actions, intentions, and consequences: the doctrine of doing and allowing. The Philosophical Review, 145, 287-312.
40. Rawls, J. 1971: A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
41. Rest, J. R. 1993: Research on moral judgment in college students. In A. Garrod (ed.), Approaches to Moral Development. New York: Teachers College Press.
42. Schnall, S., Haidt, J., Clore, G. L. and Jordan, A. H. 2008: Disgust as embodied moral judgment. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34, 1096-09.
43. Schwitzgebel, E. and Rust, J. 2009: The moral behaviour of ethics professors: peer opinion. Mind, 118, 1043-59.
44. Schwitzgebel, E. and Rust, J. 2010: Do ethicists and political philosophers vote more often than other professors? Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1, 189-99.
45. Schwitzgebel, E. and Rust, J. in preparation: The moral behavior of ethics professors.
46. Schwitzgebel, E., Rust, J., Moore, A., Huang, L. and Coates, J. in press: Ethicists' courtesy at philosophy conferences. Philosophical Psychology.
47. Singer, P. 1972: Moral experts. Analysis, 32, 115-7.
48. Spranca, M., Minsk, E. and Baron, J. 1991: Omission and commission in judgment and choice. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 27, 76-105.
49. Thomson, J. J. 1985: The trolley problem. The Yale Law Journal, 94, 1395-1415.
50. Weinberg, J., Gonnerman, C., Buckner, C. and Alexander, J. 2010: Are philosophers expert intuiters? Philosophical Psychology, 23, 331-55.
51. Wheatley, T. and Haidt, J. 2005: Hypnotic disgust makes moral judgments more severe. Psychological Science, 16, 780-84.
52. Williams, B. 1981: Moral Luck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
53. Williamson, T. 2011: Philosophical expertise and the burden of proof. Metaphilosophy, 42: 215-29.
54. Wright, J. 2010: On intuitional stability: the clear, the strong, and the paradigmatic. Cognition, 115, 491-503.
55. Young, L., Nichols, S. and Saxe, R. 2010: Investigating the neural and cognitive basis of moral luck: it's not what you do but what you know. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1, 333-49.