Persistent bias in expert judgments about free will and moral responsibility: A test of the expertise defense

Consciousness and Cognition

Volumn 20, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 1722-1731

  Schulz, Eric ^a   Cokely, Edward T ^a,b   Feltz, Adam ^c  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT   (Germany)

^b MICHIGAN TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c CMB 6208   (United States)

Author keywords

Compatibalism; Experimental philosophy; Expertise; Free will; Incompatibalism; Intuition; Judgment bias; Personality; Philosophical skill

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; COGNITION; DECISION MAKING; EXPERT SYSTEM; EXTRAVERSION; FREEDOM; HUMAN; INTUITION; KNOWLEDGE; MORALITY; PERSONALITY; PHILOSOPHY; PSYCHOLOGY; RESPONSIBILITY;

EXPERT TESTIMONY; HUMANS; INTUITION; JUDGMENT; MORAL OBLIGATIONS; OBSERVER VARIATION; PERSONAL AUTONOMY; PERSONALITY; PHILOSOPHY;

EID: 80054864473     PISSN: 10538100     EISSN: 10902376     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2011.04.007     Document Type: Article

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