Knowledge in an Uncertain World

Knowledge in an Uncertain World

Volumn 9780199550623, Issue , 2010, Pages 1-272

  Fantl, Jeremy ^a   McGrath, Matthew ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI   (United States)

Author keywords

Belief; Certainty; Chance; Contextualism; Epistemic position; Justification; Knowledge; Pragmatic encroachment; Reasons

Indexed keywords

EID: 84945665501     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199550623.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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