Armchair philosophy, metaphysical modality and counterfactual thinking

Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society

Volumn 105, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 1-23

  Williamson, Timothy ^a  

^a NEW COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34948814174     PISSN: 00667374     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0066-7373.2004.00100.x     Document Type: Article

References (13)

1. Bennett, J., 2003, A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals. Oxford: Clarendon Press
2. DePaul, M. and Ramsey, W. (eds.) 1998, Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield
3. Edgington, D., 2003, 'Counterfactuals and the Benefit of Hindsight', in P. Dowe and P. Noordhof (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals. London: Routledge
4. Gendler, T. Szabó and J. Hawthorne (eds.) 2002, Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford: Clarendon Press
5. Gettier, E., 1963, 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?', Analysis 23: 121-3
6. Lewis, D., 1986, Counterfactuals, revised edn. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press
7. Shope, R., 1983, The Analysis of Knowing: A Decade of Research. Princeton: Princeton University Press
8. Stalnaker, R., 1968, 'A Theory of Conditionals', in American Philosophical Quarterly Monographs 2 (Studies in Logical Theory): 98-112
9. Weatherson, B., 2003, 'What Good are Counterexamples?', Philosophical Studies 115: 1-31
10. Weinberg, J., Stich, S. and Nichols, S., 2001, 'Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions', Philosophical Topics 29: 429-60
11. Williamson, T., 2003, 'Understanding and Inference', Aristotelian Society sup. vol. 77: 249-93
12. Williamson, T., 2004a, 'Philosophical "Intuitions" and Scepticism about Judgement', Dialectica 58, forthcoming
13. Williamson, T., 2004b, 'Past the Linguistic Turn?', in B. Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming