Do you know more when it matters less?

Philosophical Psychology

Volumn 23, Issue 5, 2010, Pages 683-706

  Feltz, Adam ^a   Zarpentine, Chris ^b  

^a CMB 6208   (United States)

^b FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Epistemology; Experimental Philosophy; Intuitions; Practical Facts

Indexed keywords

EID: 77958105902     PISSN: 09515089     EISSN: 1465394X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2010.514572     Document Type: Article

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