The test of truth: An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion

Cognition

Volumn 129, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 279-291

  Turri, John ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO   (Canada)

Author keywords

Assertion; Excuses; Intuitions; Knowledge; Rules; Speech acts

Indexed keywords

ADULT; AGED; AGGRESSIVENESS; ARTICLE; ASSERTIVENESS; COMPREHENSION; CONFUSION; DECEPTION; EVALUATION; FEMALE; HUMAN; HUMAN EXPERIMENT; INTROSPECTION; INTUITION; MALE; NORMAL HUMAN; PRIORITY JOURNAL; QUESTIONNAIRE; THINKING;

ASSERTION; EXCUSES; INTUITIONS; KNOWLEDGE; RULES; SPEECH ACTS;

ADOLESCENT; ADULT; COMMUNICATION; FEMALE; HUMANS; MALE; MIDDLE AGED; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; YOUNG ADULT;

EID: 84882766929     PISSN: 00100277     EISSN: 18737838     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2013.06.012     Document Type: Article

References (39)

1. Alicke M.D. Culpable causation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1992, 63(3):368-378.
2. Alicke M., Rose D. Culpable control or moral concepts?. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2010, 33(04):330-331.
3. Anscombe G.E.M. Intention 1957, Blackwell, Oxford.
4. Bach K. Applying pragmatics to epistemology. Philosophical Issues 2008, 18(1):68-88.
5. Bach K., Harnish R.M. Linguistic communication and speech acts 1979, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
6. Benton M.A. Two more for the knowledge account of assertion. Analysis 2011, 71(4):684-687. 10.1093/analys/anr085.
7. Brandom R. Asserting. Nous 1983, 17(4):637-650.
8. Buckwalter, Wesley (in preparation). Factive verbs and protagonist projection. University of Waterloo.
9. Chomsky N. Aspects of the theory of syntax 1965, MIT Press.
10. Chomsky N. Syntactic structures 1957, Mouton, The Hague.
11. Cushman F., Young L., Hauser M. The role of conscious reasoning and intuition in moral judgment. Psychological Science 2006, 17(12):1082-1089.
12. DeRose K. Assertion, knowledge, and context. The Philosophical Review 2002, 111(2):167-203.
13. Douven I. Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility. Philosophical Review 2006, 115(4):449-485.
14. Gibbs R.W., Moise J.F. Pragmatics in understanding what is said. Cognition 1997, 62:1-24.
15. Grice H.P.H. Studies in the way of words 1989, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
16. Hazlett A. The myth of factive verbs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2010, 80(3):497-522.
17. Hazlett A. Factive presupposition and the truth condition on knowledge. Acta Analytica 2012, 27(4):461-478.
18. Hill C., Schechter J. Hawthorne's lottery puzzle and the nature of belief. Philosophical Issues 2007, 17:102-122.
19. Kvanvig J. Assertion, knowledge, and lotteries. Williamson on knowledge 2009, 140-160. Oxford University Press, Oxford. D. Pritchard, P. Greenough (Eds.).
20. Lackey J. Norms of Assertion. NoÛs 2007, 41(4):594-626.
21. Noveck I.A., Sperber D. Experimental pragmatics 2004, Palgrave Macmillan.
22. Rakoczy H., Tomasello M. Done wrong or said wrong? Young children understand the normative directions of fit of different speech acts. Cognition 2009, 113(2):205-212.
23. Rescorla M. Assertion and its constitutive norms. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2009, 79(1):98-130.
24. Schaffer J. Knowledge in the image of assertion. Philosophical Issues 2008, 18(1):1-19.
25. Searle J.R. Speech acts 1969, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
26. Searle J.R. Expression and meaning 1979, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
27. Sutton J. Without justification 2007, MIT Press.
28. Turri, J. & Blouw, P. (in press). Excuse validation.
29. Turri J. Epistemic invariantism and speech act contextualism. Philosophical Review 2010, 119(1):77-95.
30. Turri J. Prompting challenges. Analysis 2010, 70(3):456-462.
31. Turri J. The express knowledge account of assertion. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 2011, 89(1):37-45, DOI: 10.1080/00048401003660333.
32. Turri J. Mythology of the factive. Logos & Episteme 2011, 2(1):143-152.
33. Turri J. Knowledge and suberogatory assertion. Philosophical Studies 2013, 10.1007/s11098-013-0112-z.
34. Turri, J., & Friedman, O. (2013). Winners and losers in the folk epistemology of lotteries. In: Beebe, J.R. (Ed.), Advances in experimental epistemology. Continuum.
35. Unger P. Ignorance: a case for skepticism 1975, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
36. Weiner M. Must we know what we say?. Philosophical Review 2005, 114(2):227-251.
37. Williamson T. Knowing and asserting. Philosophical Review 1996, 105(4):489-523.
38. Williamson T. Knowledge and its limits 2000, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
39. Wilson D., Sperber D. Meaning and relevance 2012, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.