Surprising connections between knowledge and action: The robustness of the epistemic side-effect effect

Philosophical Psychology

Volumn 25, Issue 5, 2012, Pages 689-715

  Beebe, James R ^a   Jensen, Mark ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO   (United States)

Author keywords

Experimental Epistemology; Folk Psychology; Knobe Effect; Knowledge Attribution

Indexed keywords

EID: 84864708458     PISSN: 09515089     EISSN: 1465394X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2011.622439     Document Type: Article

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