The ordinary language basis for contextualism, and the new invariantism

Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 55, Issue 219, 2005, Pages 172-198

  DeRose, Keith ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33846838169     PISSN: 00318094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00394.x     Document Type: Article

References (9)

1. D. Lewis, 'Causation as Influence', Journal of Philosophy, 97 (2000), pp. 182-97, at p. 196. I advocated the asymmetry urged in this section in correspondence with Lewis in the early 1990s, where I wielded it against his account of the relation between 'might' and 'would' counterfactual conditionals
2. This later came out in my 'Lewis on "Might" and "Would" Counterfactual Conditionals', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 24 (1994), pp. 413-18, at pp. 417-18. Lewis might have already accepted that asymmetry at the time. He raised no methodological objection to me in his correspondence
3. See my 'Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52 (2002), pp. 913-29, at p. 913
4. Thus where Jason Stanley alters my bank cases in presenting them, collapsing two separate cases, one of which never involves high stakes, and the other of which does involve high stakes that are clear to the speakers when the denial of 'knowledge' is made, into one temporally extended case in which the speaker first claims to 'know', but then, after being reminded of the high stakes that she has faced all along, concedes that she does not 'know' ('On the Linguistic Basis for Contextualism', Philosophical Studies, 119 (2004), pp. 119-46, at pp. 120-1), the change hurts the effectiveness of the cases, for the early positive claim of knowledge in Stanley's temporally extended case is of just the problematic type we have been discussing
5. S. Cohen, 'Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons', Philosophical Perspectives, 13 (1999), pp. 57-89, at p. 58
6. T. Williamson, 'Knowledge and Scepticism', to appear in F. Jackson and M. Smith (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Analytic Philosophy (Oxford UP)
7. cf. R. Feldman, 'Contextualism and Skepticism', Philosophical Perspectives, 13 (1999), pp. 93-115, at pp. 103ff
8. J. Stanley, 'Context, Interest-Relativity, and Knowledge', draft of 11 January 2004, p. 46
9. See Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries (Oxford UP, 2004)