Experimental philosophy

Annual Review of Psychology

Volumn 63, Issue , 2012, Pages 81-99

  Knobe, Joshua ^a   Buckwalter, Wesley ^b   Nichols, Shaun ^c   Robbins, Philip ^d   Sarkissian, Hagop ^e   Sommers, Tamler ^f  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI   (United States)

^e CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

^f UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON   (United States)

Author keywords

Causation; Consciousness; Free will; Moral psychology; Moral relativism

Indexed keywords

COGNITION; CONSCIOUSNESS; HUMAN; INTUITION; MORALITY; PERSONAL AUTONOMY; PHILOSOPHY; REVIEW; THINKING;

CONSCIOUSNESS; HUMANS; INTUITION; MORALS; PERSONAL AUTONOMY; PHILOSOPHY; THINKING; VOLITION;

EID: 82955173091     PISSN: 00664308     EISSN: 15452085     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev-psych-120710-100350     Document Type: Review

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