Lies, damned lies, and statistics: An empirical investigation of the concept of lying

Philosophical Psychology

Volumn 26, Issue 6, 2013, Pages 790-816

  Arico, Adam J ^a   Fallis, Don ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

Conceptual Analysis; Experimental Philosophy; Lying

Indexed keywords

EID: 84885041436     PISSN: 09515089     EISSN: 1465394X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2012.725977     Document Type: Article

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