Knowledge, stakes, and mistakes

Nous

Volumn 49, Issue 2, 2015, Pages 201-234

  Buckwalter, Wesley ^a   Schaffer, Jonathan ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO   (Canada)

^b RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84928610662     PISSN: 00294624     EISSN: 14680068     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/nous.12017     Document Type: Review

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