Moral intuitions: Are philosophers experts?

Philosophical Psychology

Volumn 26, Issue 5, 2013, Pages 629-638

  Tobia, Kevin ^a   Buckwalter, Wesley ^b   Stich, Stephen ^a  

^a RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

Author keywords

Actor Observer Bias; Expertise Defense; Intuition

Indexed keywords

EID: 84872144805     PISSN: 09515089     EISSN: 1465394X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2012.696327     Document Type: Article

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