Knowledge and luck

Psychonomic Bulletin and Review

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 2015, Pages 378-390

  Turri, John ^a   Buckwalter, Wesley ^a   Blouw, Peter ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO   (Canada)

Author keywords

Knowledge attribution; Luck; Social cognition

Indexed keywords

ACHIEVEMENT; ADOLESCENT; ADULT; APTITUDE; AWARENESS; CONTROL; DECISION MAKING; FEMALE; HUMAN; KNOWLEDGE; MALE; MIDDLE AGED; PROBLEM SOLVING; RANDOMIZATION; YOUNG ADULT;

ACHIEVEMENT; ADOLESCENT; ADULT; APTITUDE; AWARENESS; FEMALE; HUMANS; INTERNAL-EXTERNAL CONTROL; JUDGMENT; KNOWLEDGE; MALE; MIDDLE AGED; PROBLEM SOLVING; RANDOM ALLOCATION; YOUNG ADULT;

EID: 84936946262     PISSN: 10699384     EISSN: 15315320     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3758/s13423-014-0683-5     Document Type: Article

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