Intuitions about consciousness: Experimental studies

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

Volumn 7, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 67-83

  Knobe, Joshua ^a   Prinz, Jesse ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

Consciousness; Experimental philosophy; Folk psychology; Theory of mind

Indexed keywords

EID: 38049113320     PISSN: 15687759     EISSN: 15728676     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11097-007-9066-y     Document Type: Article

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