Knowledge and Practical Interests

Knowledge and Practical Interests

Volumn 9780199288038, Issue , 2005, Pages 1-208

  Stanley, Jason ^a  

^a RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Action; Contextualism; Epistemology; Gradable adjectives; Interest Relative Invariantism; Practical reasoning; Relativism; Skepticism; Sorites paradox

Indexed keywords

EID: 84945654770     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/0199288038.001.0001     Document Type: Book

References (90)

1. Burge, Tyler (1979). 'Semantical Paradox', Journal of Philosophy, 76: 169-98.
2. Cappelen, Herman and Lepore, Ernie (2005). Insensitive Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell).
3. Cohen, Stewart (1988). 'How to Be a Fallibilist', in J. Tomberlin (ed.), Epistemology (Philosophical Perspectives, 2, Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview), 91-123.
4. Cohen, Stewart (1991). 'Skepticism, Relevance, and Relativity', in Brian McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and his Critics (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell).
5. Cohen, Stewart (1999). 'Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons', in J. Tomberlin (ed.), Epistemology (Philosophical Perspectives, 13; Oxford: Blackwell), 57-89.
6. Cohen, Stewart (2000). 'Contextualism and Skepticism', in E. Sosa and E. Villaneuva (eds.), Skepticism (Philosophical Issues, 10), 94-107.
7. DeRose, Keith (1991). 'Epistemic Possibilities', Philosophical Review, 100/4: 581-605.
8. DeRose, Keith (1992). 'Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52/4: 913-29.
9. DeRose, Keith (1995). 'Solving the Skeptical Puzzle', Philosophical Review, 104: 1-52.
10. DeRose, Keith (1996). 'Knowledge, Assertion, and Lotteries', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 568-80.
11. DeRose, Keith (1999). 'Contextualism: An Explanation and Defense', in J. Greco and E. Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell), 187-205.
12. DeRose, Keith (2000). 'Now You Know It, Now You Don't', Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, v. Epistemology (Bowling Green, OH: Philosophy Documentation Center), 91-106.
13. DeRose, Keith (2002). 'Assertion, Knowledge, and Context', Philosophical Review, 111:167-203.
14. DeRose, Keith (2004). 'Single-Scoreboard Semantics', Philosophical Studies, 119/1-2: 1-21.
15. DeRose, Keith (forthcoming). 'The Ordinary Language Basis for Contextualism and the New Invariantism', Philosophical Quarterly.
16. Dretske, Fred (1970). 'Epistemic Operators', Journal of Philosophy, 67: 1007-23.
17. Dretske, Fred (1981). Knowledge and the Flow of Information (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press)
18. Dretske, Fred (2000). 'The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge', in Dretske, Perception, Knowledge, and Belief: Selected Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
19. Ellis, Jonathan (2004). 'Context, Indexicals, and the Sorites', Analysis, 64/4: 362-4.
20. Enç, Mürvet (1996). 'Tense and Modality', in Shalom Lappin (ed.), The Handbook of Contemporary Semantic Theory (Oxford: Blackwell), 345-58.
21. Evans, Gareth (1985). 'Reference and Contingency', in Collected Papers (Oxford:Clarendon Press), 178-213.
22. Fantl, Jeremy and McGrath, Matthew (2002). 'Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification', Philosophical Review, 111/1: 67-94.
23. Feldman, Richard (1999). 'Contextualism and Skepticism', in J. Tomberlin (ed.), Epistemology (Philosophical Perspectives, 13; Oxford: Blackwell), 93-115.
24. Frege, Gottlob (1979). 'Logic', in Posthumous Writings, ed. H. Hermes, H. Kambartel, and F. Kaulbach, trans. Long and White (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 126-51.
25. Gauker, Christopher (2003). Words without Meaning (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
26. Gillies, Anthony (forthcoming). 'Shifty Epistemology'.
27. Glanzberg, Michael (2001). 'The Liar in Context', Philosophical Studies, 103: 217-51.
28. Glanzberg, Michael (2004). 'A Contextual-Hierarchical Approach to Truth and the Liar Paradox', Journal of Philosophical Logic, 33: 27-88.
29. Goldman, Alvin (1976). 'Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge', Journal of Philosophy, 73 (1976), 771-91.
30. Graff, Delia (2000). 'Shifting Sands: An Interest-Relative Theory of Vagueness' Philosophical Topics, 28/1: 45-81.
31. Halliday, Dan (forthcoming). 'Contextualism, Comparatives, and Gradability', Philosophical Studies.
32. Harman, Gilbert and Sherman, Brett (2004). 'Knowledge, Assumptions, Lotteries', Philosophical Issues, 14: 492-50.
33. Hawthorne, John (2004). Knowledge and Lotteries (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
34. Heller, Mark (1999). 'Contextualism and Anti-Luck Epistemology', in J. Tomberlin (ed.), Epistemology (Philosophical Perspectives, 13; Oxford: Blackwell), 115-29.
35. Joyce, James (2002). 'Levi on Causal Decision Theory and the Possibility of Predicting One's Own Actions', Philosophical Studies, 110: 69-102.
36. Kamp, H. (1981). 'The Paradox of the Heap', in U. Monnich (ed.), Aspects of Philosophical Logic (Dordrecht: Reidel).
37. Kaplan, David (1989). 'Demonstratives', in Joseph Almog, John Perry, and Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 481-63.
38. Kennedy, C. (1999). Projecting the Adjective: The Syntax and Semantics of Gradability and Comparison (New York: Garland Press).
39. King, Jeffrey (1998). 'What is a Philosophical Analysis?' Philosophical Studies, 90: 155-79.
40. King, Jeffrey (2001). Complex Demonstratives: A Quantificational Account (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
41. King, Jeffrey (2003). 'Tense, Modality, and Semantic Value', in John Hawthorne and Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Language and Philosophical Linguistics (Philosophical Perspectives, 17; Oxford: Blackwell).
42. Klein, Peter (2000). 'Contextualism and Academic Skepticism', Philosophical Issues, 10:108-16.
43. Kratzer, Angelika (1977). 'What "Must" and "Can" Must and Can Mean', Linguistics and Philosophy, 1: 337-55.
44. Lasersohn, Peter (forthcoming). 'Context Dependence, Disagreement, and Predicates of Personal Taste'.
45. Lewis, David (1981). 'Index, Context, and Content', in Stig Kanger and Sven Ohman (eds.), Philosophy and Grammar: Papers on the Occasion of the Quincentennial of Uppsala University (Dordrecht: D. Reidel), 79-100.
46. Lewis, David (1983). 'Scorekeeping in a Language Game', in Lewis, Philosophical Papers (New York: Oxford University Press), i. 233-49.
47. Lewis, David (1996). 'Elusive Knowledge', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 549-67.
48. Ludlow, Peter (1989). 'Implicit Comparison Classes', Linguistics and Philosophy, 12: 519-33.
49. Ludlow, Peter (2005). 'Contextualism and the New Linguistic Turn in Epistemology', in G. Preyer and G. Peters (eds.), Contextualism in Philosophy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
50. MacFarlane, John (2005a). 'The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge-Attributions', in T. Gendler-Szabo and J. Hawthorne (eds.), The Oxford Guide to Epistemology.
51. Gendler-Szabo (2005b). 'Making Sense of Relative Truth', in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.
52. Moore, G. E. (1993). Commonplace Book 1919-1953 (Bristol: Thoemmes Press).
53. Neta, Ram (2003). 'Contextualism and the Problem of the External World', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66: 1-31.
54. Neta, Ram (forthcoming). 'Contextualism and a Puzzle about Seeing', Philosophical Studies.
55. Nunberg, G., Sag, I., and Wasow, T. (1994). 'Idioms', Language, 70: 491-538.
56. Parsons, Charles (1974). 'The Liar Paradox', Journal of Philosophical Logic, 3: 381-412.
57. Partee, Barbara (1973). 'Some Structural Analogies between Tenses and Pronouns in English', Journal of Philosophy, 70: 601-9.
58. Partee, Barbara (1989). 'Binding Implicit Variables in Quantified Contexts', in C. Wiltshire, B. Music, and R. Graczyk (eds.), Papers from CLS 25: 342-65 (Chicago: Chicago Linguistics Society).
59. Raffman, D. (1994). 'Vagueness without Paradox', Philosophical Review, 103/1: 41-74.
60. Raffman, D. (1996). 'Vagueness and Context-Sensitivity', Philosophical Studies, 81: 175-92.
61. Richard, Mark (1981). 'Temporalism and Eternalism', Philosophical Studies, 39: 1-13.
62. Richard, Mark (1982). 'Tense, Propositions, and Meanings', Philosophical Studies, 41: 337-51.
63. Richard, Mark (2004). 'Contextualism and Relativism', Philosophical Studies, 119/1-2: 215-41.
64. Robertson, T. (2000). 'On Soames's Solution to the Sorites Paradox', Analysis, 60/4: 328-34.
65. Rysiew, Patrick (2001). 'The Context-Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions', Nous, 35/4:477-514.
66. Salmon, Nathan (1986). Frege's Puzzle (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
67. Salmon, Nathan (1989). 'Tense and Singular Propositions', in Joseph Almog, John Perry, and Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 331-92.
68. Schaffer, Jonathan (2004). 'From Contextualism to Contrastivism', Philosophical Studies, 119/1-2: 73-103.
69. Schiffer, Stephen (1996). 'Contextualist Solutions to Skepticism', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 96: 317-33.
70. Schlenker, Philippe (2003). 'A Plea for Monsters'. Linguistics and Philosophy, 26: 29-120
71. Soames, Scott (1986). 'Incomplete Definite Descriptions', Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 349-75.
72. Soames, Scott (1998). 'Wide Scope and Rigidified Descriptions', Nous, 32: 1-22.
73. Soames, Scott (1999). Understanding Truth (New York: Oxford University Press).
74. Soames, Scott (2002). 'Replies', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 429-52.
75. Stanley, Jason (1997). 'Names and Rigid Designation', in B. Hale and C. Wright (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language (Oxford: Blackwell), 555-85.
76. Stanley, Jason (2000). 'Context and Logical Form', Linguistics and Philosophy, 23/4: 391-434.
77. Stanley, Jason (2002). 'Nominal Restriction', in G. Peters and G. Preyer, Logical Form and Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 365-88.
78. Stanley, Jason (2005a). 'Fallibilism and Concessive Knowledge Attributions', Analysis, 65/2: 126-31.
79. Stanley, Jason (2005b). 'Semantics in Context', in Gerhard Preyer and G. Peter (eds.), Contextualism (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
80. Stanley, Jason and Szabo, Z. (2000). 'On Quantifier Domain Restriction', Mind and Language, 15:219-61.
81. Stanley, Jason and Williamson, T. (1995). 'Quantifiers and Context-Dependence', Analysis, 55: 291-5.
82. Stanley, Jason and Williamson, T. (2001). 'Knowing How', Journal of Philosophy, 90/8: 411-44.
83. Stine, Gail (1976). 'Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure', Philosophical Studies, 29: 249-61.
84. Tappenden, J. (1993). 'The Liar and Sorites Paradoxes: Toward a Unified Treatment', Journal of Philosophy, 90: 551-77.
85. Unger, Peter (1975). A Case Study for Skepticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
86. Vogel, Jonathan (1999). 'Relevant Alternatives Theory', in J. Tomberlin (ed.), Epistemology (Philosophical Perspectives, 13; Oxford: Blackwell), 155-80.
87. Wettstein, Howard (1984). 'How to Bridge the Gap between Meaning and Reference', Synthese, 58: 63-84.
88. Williamson, Timothy (2000). Knowledge and its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
89. Williamson, Timothy (2005). 'Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism, and Knowledge of Knowledge', Philosophical Quarterly.
90. Yourgrau, Palle (1983). 'Knowledge and Relevant Alternatives', Synthese, 55: 175-90.